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COMMENTS
RIGHT OF A SURVIVING PARTNER TO PURCHASE A DECEASED
PARTNER'S INTEREST UNDER THE UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT
The rules of law applicable to the creation, continuance and termination of a partnership are established in forty-two states by the relevant
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act. 1 The act provides that the death
of a partner dissolves the partnership,2 whereupon the estate of the deceased partner acquires a right to a payment on account of his interest in
the partnership. 3 The act is quite clear as to some aspects of this problem-for instance, the right of the surviving partners to possess firm property4 and their right to wind up the partnership affairs. 5 However, it is
not so clear that the survivors, in the absence of agreement, invariably
have a duty to liquidate the partnership as the sole means of satisfying the
estate of the deceased partner. For the purposes of this discussion, the
following hypothetical situation illustrates the problem: D and S formed
a partnership which has been dissolved by the death of partner D. S,
wishing to continue the business in which the partnership was engaged,
desires to purchase D's interest and has offered a fair price therefor, but
the legal representative of D's estate has refused the offer. Neither the
partnership agreement nor D's will contains any provision dealing with the
existing situation. The question presented is whether S may make a courtsanctioned purchase of D's interest, or whether the legal representative of
D will be able to force a liquidation sale of the partnership assets and
thereby bring the enterprise to an end as a going concern.
1 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -65 (1949); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-201 to
-244 (1956); ARK. STAT. §§ 65-101 to -143 (1947); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 15001-45; CoLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 104-1-1 to -43 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 34-39 to -81 (1961); DEL,
CoDE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-43 (1953); GUAM CIV. CoDE §§ 2395-2472 (Supp. 1962); IDAHO
CoDE ANN. §§ 53-301 to -343 (1957); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106½, §§ 1-43 (1961); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 50-401 to -443 (1951); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 362.150-.360 (1962); Mo. ANN. CODE art.
73A, §§ 1-43 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 108A, §§ 1-44 (1954); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
449.1-.43 (1948); MINN. STAT. §§ 323.01-.43 (1961); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 358.010-.430 (1959);
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 63.101-.515 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67.301-.343 (1958); NEV,
R.Ev. STAT. §§ 87.010-.430 (1959); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 42:1-1 to -43 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 66-1-1 to -43 (1960); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw §§ 1-74; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-31 to -73
(1960); N.D. CENT. CooE §§ 45-05-01 to -09-15 (1960); Omo REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1775.01-.42
(Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 201-244 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 68.010-.650 (1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1-105 (1930); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 7-12-12 to -55 (1956); s.c.
CooE §§ 52-1 to -79 (1962); S.D. CODE §§ 49.0101-.0615 (1939); TENN. CooE ANN. §§ 61-101
to -142 (1955); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6132b, §§ 1-45 (1962); UTAH CooE ANN. §§ 48-1-1
to -40 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1121-1335 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to -43
(1958); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 25.04.010-.430 (1955); w. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-8A-1 to -45
(1961); WIS. STAT. §§ 123.01-.38 (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-195 to -237 (1957).
2 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(4) (1949) (hereinafter cited as U.P.A.).
3 U.P.A. § 43.
4 U.P.A. § 25(2)(d).
5 U.P.A. § 37.
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Of course, rights of the parties upon dissolution may be fixed by a
partnership agreement, in which the parties are free to incorporate one of
three of the more usual types of provisions: that the interest of a deceased
partner shall be sold to the survivors; that the deceased partner's interest
in the partnership shall continue, with the partnership business being
perpetuated, for a given period of time; or that a partner's interest in the
partnership shall exist only during his lifetime. 6 Apart from such an
agreed-upon provision, a few states have specifically adapted their probate
laws to deal with the foregoing problem; 7 the vast majority, however,
leave the solution in such circumstances entirely to the operation of the
Uniform Partnership Act.
At common law the doctrine developed that, upon the dissolution of a
partnership by the death of one of its members, a liquidation of the
partnership assets was necessary to terminate the partnership business.
Basically there were two reasons advanced for this rule. The first was to
insure payment of the claims of partnership creditors; for if the old
partnership was continued the danger existed that the creditors of the
old partnership would be considered merely personal creditors of the
surviving partners and not creditors of the new or continued partnership.8
The second reason arose from the great disparity of knowledge between
the surviving partners and the representative of the deceased partner as to
the value of the partnership assets. 9 Fear that the legal representatives of
a deceased partner might be exposed to fraud and overreaching seemingly
dictated a liquidation sale of the partnership assets as the best possible
means of determining the value of the partnership. Although the problems concerning the payment of creditors of the old partnership have been
specifically resolved by the Uniform Partnership Act, 10 there still remains
the possibility that fraud may be worked upon the estate of a deceased
partner. This discussion is intended to demonstrate that, under the act,
the likelihood of fraud should no longer be so controlling a factor as to
require invariably a liquidation sale of partnership assets when a court of
equity has within its supervisory powers the ability to protect fully all of
the parties involved when a partnership is dissolved by death.
It is widely appreciated that many businesses have value only as going
concerns, and thus the immediate liquidation of partnership assets upon
the death of a partner in many circumstances can only result in a serious
reduction of the worth of such a partnership. Obviously, such a reduction
a For discussion and evaluation of the various types of partnership agreement provisions, see generally Fuller, Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise
After the Death of a Partner, 50 YALE L.J. 202 (1940); Comment, 72 HARv. L. REv.
1!102 (1959).
7 Sec notes 64 & 65 infra.
s However, a promise to pay such old creditors was often implied. See Lewis, The
Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 634-36 (1915).
o Annot., 1917C Ann. Cas. 946. See also note 28 infra.
10 U.P.A. § 41. See generally text accompanying notes 35-37 infra.
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affects the interests of the decedent's estate and the surviving partner in a
like manner. In appropriate circumstances a reasonable alternative to
liquidation is a court-sanctioned sale of the deceased partner's interest
directly to the surviving partner or partners. With court supervision all
the legitimate interests of a deceased partner's estate can be fully protected,
while at the same time the surviving partners can achieve the equally reasonable objective of safeguarding their own continuing interests. In order
to substantiate the desirability and legitimacy of this alternative to liquidation, a detailed consideration of the relevant sections of the Uniform Partnership Act is necessary.

I.

UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP

Aar

PROVISIONS

A partnership is dissolved by the death of any of its partners.11 The
act defines dissolution as "the change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the business." 12 The effect of dissolution is not to terminate the partnership; rather the partnership "continues
until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed."13 As such, the
terms "dissolution" and "termination," as employed by: the act, have
different meanings. Dissolution does not completely extinguish authority
of the surviving partner to deal with partnership property. As prescribed
by the act, the order of events is: (I) dissolution, the point in time when the
partners cease to carry on the business together; (2) winding up, the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution; and (3) termination,
the point at which the partnership affairs have been entirely wound up.l4
In the usual circumstances, "winding up" has been thought to refer to,
and require, a liquidation of partnership assets, the payment of partnership debts, and the distribution to the partners of the cash value of their
partnership interests. 15 However, at no place in the two sections referred
to above, nor in the Commissioners' notes thereto, is the term "liquidation"
found. And, as will be seen subsequently, when the act does deal with a
liquidation situation, that term is used specifically. Thus, it must be concluded that "winding up" was conceived as a term of art, encompassing
the process of "liquidation," yet not necessarily requiring a liquidation
sale in every instance.
The single most significant section of the act concerning the proposed
U.P.A. § 31(4).
§ 29.
§ 30, which provides: "On dissolution the partnership is not terminated,
but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed."
14 See U .P.A. § 29, Commissioners' Note, which states: "In this act dissolution designates the point in time when the partners cease to carry on the business together;
termination is the point in time when all the partnership affairs are wound up; winding
up, the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution." 7 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, Partnership, 165-6 (1949).
15 CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 428-35 (2d ed. 1952).
11

12 U.P.A.
13 U.P.A.
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survivor's purchase as an alternative to a liquidation sale is section 37.
It provides as follows:
"Right to Wind Up-Unless otherwise agreed the partners who
have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership . . . [have] the right
to wi?Zd up the partnership affairs; provided, however, that any
partner, his legal representative or his assignee, upon cause shown,
may obtain winding up by the court."16
In conjunction with sections 33,17 35(1),1 8 25(2)(d),19 38(1) 20 and 43 21
of the act, section 37 confers upon a surviving partner expressly or impliedly, an almost unqualified authority to wind up the partnership
afiairs. 22 Thus, the legal representative of a deceased partner cannot as
such legally interfere in the ordinary "winding up" of the partnership
affairs. 23 In this relati.onship to the estate of the deceased partner for the
purposes of winding up the partnership affairs, the surviving partner has
been analogized by the courts to a trustee.24 While he is empowered to
possess all of the partnership property for purposes of winding up, his
power is limited to the performance of only those acts which are indis16 The omitted words arc: " . . • or the legal representative of the last surviving
partner, not bankrupt, has ••.." (Emphasis added.)
17 "Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete
transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of any
partner to act for the partnership •.•." U.P.A. § 33.
18 "(l) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership • • . (a) By any act
appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished at
dissolution ••••" U.P.A. § 35(1).
10 "On death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the
surviving partner or partners. . • • Such surviving partner or partners . . • [have] no
right to possess the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose." U.P.A.
§ 25(2)(d).
20 "When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through
them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may
have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied
to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners . . . ." U.P.A. § 38(1).
21 "The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, ·or his legal
representative, as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person
or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary." U.P.A. § 43.
22 Silberfcld v. Swiss Bank Corp., 273 App. Div. 686, 79 N.Y.S.2d 380, afj'd without
opinion, 298 N.Y. 776, 83 N.E.2d 468 (1948).
23 As to the possible conflict of this aspect of the U.P.A. with various state probate
codes giving the executor of a deceased partner the right to administer partnership
property, sec Comment, 22 WASH. L. REv. 35 (1947). The one court found to have been
presented with this question in fact ruled that the probate provisions in conflict with the
Uniform Partnership Act had been repealed by implication. Davis v. Hutchinson, 36
F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1929) (concurring opinion). See also O'Connell, Need for Statutory
Revision in Oregon, 23 ORE. L. REv. 93, 107 (1944).
24 E.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Dennis, 256 App. Div. 495, 10 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1939),
aff'd mem., 282 N.Y. 635, 25 N.E.2d 981 (1940); In re Johnson's Estate, 232 N.C. 59, 59
S.E.2d 223 (1950); Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 79 A.2d 205 (1951).
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pensable to that end. 2 r; How long the winding up may last and what acts
of the survivor are compatible with that result necessarily vary with respect to the type of business enterprise being concluded.26 By its terms,
section 37 does give to the legal representative of a deceased partner
the right to enforce a winding up sanctioned by a court, when "cause" for
such action can be shown. This has been interpreted as allowing a court
to appoint a receiver for the partnership assets when the surviving partner
is either unable or unwilling to carry out the winding up process on his
own behalf.27 A receiver's sale is then held in order to liquidate the partnership.
Section 37 also allows "any partner" to obtain a court-controlled winding up "upon cause shown." Since the phrase "any partner" certainly includes surviving partners, S in our hypothetical situation should be entitled to such relief if he so desires and can show "cause." Various practical
circumstances are considered as being sufficient to provide the requisite
"cause" for a surviving partner to invoke this provision. For example, the
complexities inherent in the process of accounting for interests in the
partnership business have been considered "cause" within the foregoing
definition, as has the fact that one of several surviving partners has exceeded his authority in the winding-up process. It is apparent, then, that
in many cases it will be to the definite advantage of a surviving partner
that a court have control of the winding up and liquidation process.
Moreover, there appear to be other reasons why a surviving partner,
though not wanting a liquidation of the partnership, should nevertheless
find it both necessary and desirable for a court to control "winding up."
An example would be our hypothetical situation, in which S desires to
acquire dirrctly D's interest in the partnership. Since a "winding up"
partner acts as a fiduciary in his relation to the estate of a deceased partner,
he is forbidden, in such capacity, irrespective of the adequacy of the consideration, to transfer partnership property to himself. Yet, were a court
for any reason to assume control of a "winding up" and, in so doing, order
a liquidation sale by a court-appointed receiver, the surviving partner
·would no- longer stand in a fiduciary capacity and would be as free to
purchase at such a sale as any third party. Thus, a feasible course of action
for a surviving partner desiring to purchase the partnership assets would
25 See, e.g., McKinley v. Long, 227 Ind. 639, 88 N.E.2d 382 (1949); Ewing v. Caldwell,
243 N.C. 18, 89 S.E.2d 774 (1955); Wood v. Wood, 312 Pa. 374, 167 Atl. 600 (1933).
26 See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 1391 (1957).
27 Jay v. Clark, 85 Cal. App. 2d 88, 192 P.2d 462 (1948) (court also relying on CAL.
PROB. ConE § 571). See also McKinley v. Long, 227 Ind. 639, 88 N.E.2d 382 (1949)
(receiver appointed though not a decedent situation); ·wanderski v. Nowakowski, 331
Mich. 202, 49 N.W.2d 139 (1951) (receiver appointed though not a decedent situation).
Compare Orem v. Moore, 224 Ark. 146, 272 S."W.2d 60 (1954), where the court noted
that the wisdom of allowing the surviving partner to wind up the business had not
been sufficiently overridden by the legal representative's proof of the necessity for a
receiver. See generally HIGH, RECEIVERS 523 (3d ed. 1894).
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be to refuse to wind up the partnership affairs himself, thereby making it
necessary for the representative of a deceased partner to initiate a section
37 court-controlled winding up.
A more direct approach by a surviving partner wishing to purchase a
deceased partner's interest seems both logical and desirable. In short, might
not S's desire to purchase the interest of D in the partnership assets be
sufficient "cause" within the meaning of section 37 so as to vest control of
"winding up" in a court on application by S? And since "winding up"
does not necessarily refer solely to liquidation, should not a court proceed
with that form of "winding up" which most adequately protects the interests of all the parties? Under the rule at common law,28 to obviate any
possibility of fraud or overreaching, the representatives of a deceased partner were allowed to insist upon a liquidation of the partnership assets by
sale, even though such action was not necessary for payment of partnership
debts, and even though the proceeds would scarcely approximate the true
value of the assets as a going concem.29 Yet, it is in this very set of circumstances, where a liquidation sale of the partnership assets at salvage value
is the best price obtainable, that our hypothetical situation would most
often arise. In such circumstances, if a court had control of the windingup process, a court-controlled accounting and a valuation of the deceased
partner's interest ascertained as an incident thereto could provide a logical
and equitable alternative to a liquidation sale, and could be allowed on
application by the surviving partner. The survivor's payment of this
amount, as the purchase price of the deceased partner's share, would inure
to the benefit of all the parties, for such survivor should almost invariably
be willing to pay more than a purchaser at a judicial sale, when in so doing
he can avoid the potential losses occasioned by a liquidation and forced
sale. Certainly the possibility of the deceased's representative being exposed to fraud and overreaching should not dictate a liquidation sale when
a court can so fully protect that interest and at the same time permit the
surviving partner to accomplish a legitimate end. Yet, though much can be
said in favor of such a judicially supervised "winding up," there is no
authority sustaining its use under section 37. However, no cases have been
found which would deny the validity of such a procedure.30
Keeping in mind the proposed interpretation of section 37, it becomes
necessary to look to other sections of the act which relate to dissolution
and winding up of a partnership. Generally, it can be stated that a number
:::8 CRANE, op. cit: supra note 15, at 459-67; LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIPS 568, 625 (12th ed.
1962); 40 AM. JuR. Partnerships § 309 (1942); Annot., 1917C Ann. Cas. 948; 68 C.J.S. Partnerships § 285(b), at 785 (1950). Nor could he tortiously convert the personal property of
the partnership and thereby become the owner. In re McCormick's Estate, 286 Ill. App.
90, 2 N.E.2d 967 (1936).
:m Sec, e.g., Bagg v. Osborn, 169 Minn. 126, 210 N.W. 862 (1926); Crawshay v. Collins,
15 Ves. Jun. 218, 33 Eng. Rep. 736 (Ch. 1808); LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 568-69,
625.
30 See text at note 45 infra.
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of these sections add force to the proposed interpretation of section 37,
while the remainder do nothing to foreclose the possibility of utilizing
such a procedure. The first important provision is section 38.31 Paragraph
(1) of this section provides that when dissolution of a partnership is caused
in any way, other than in contravention of the partnership agreement,
"each partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming through
them . . . , unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property"
applied to pay the firm debts and "the surplus applied to pay in cash the
net amount owing to the respective partners." (Emphasis added.) Quite
obviously omitted from the language of this section is any reference to the
"legal representative" of a deceased partner, and, since that term is found
extensively throughout other provisions of the act, its absence here must
be presumed to have been intentional. Therefore, it appears that section
38 gives "each partner," including a surviving partner, the right to require
a liquidation of the partnership so as to satisfy its liabilities, and to have
the balance distributed in cash. Section 38, by its terms, does not give this
right to the legal representative of a deceased partner. Thus, section 38(1)
raises no obstacles which would prevent a court from ordering such a sale
and purchase as a means of "winding up" a dissolved partnership, when
requested to do so by a surviving partner.
Paragraph (2) of section 38, establishing the rights of the partners when
the partnership has been dissolved in contravention of the partnership
agreement,32 also lends support to the proposed interpretation of section
37. Specifically, a liquidation sale of partnership assets is dispensed with
when the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the partnership wish
to continue the business. Provision is made for the purchase of the wrongdoer's interest by the innocent partners.33 A bond may be required of the
innocent partners by the court, but no method of valuation of the interest to be purchased is established. Yet, the act seemingly contemplates
that the court requiring the bond will closely scrutinize the transaction to
insure fairness to all parties. Certainly, if a court in this setting is capable
of ascertaining the interest of a partner in an existing partnership, it
should be no more difficult for it to ascertain the value of a deceased
partner's share. In sum, section 38(2) embodies a legislative recognition
of the fact that liquidation may not be the most satisfactory means of
U.P.A. § 38(1), quoted in note 20 supra.
U.P.A. § 38(2), which provides: "When dissolution is caused in contravention of
the partnership agreement the rights of the parties shall be as follows ••• (b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire to continue the
business in the same name, either by themselves or jointly with others, may do so, during
the agreed term for the partnership and for that purpose may possess the partnership
property, provided they secure the payment by bond approved by the court, or pay
to any partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully, the value of his interest ••• ,
and in like manner indemnify him against all present or future partnership liabilities."
33 See, e.g., Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 254 P.2d 919 (1954); Glazer v.
Kurman, 384 Pa. 283, 120 A.2d 892 (1956).
81
82
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"winding up" a wrongfully dissolved partnership in all situations. The
proposed interpretation of section 37 extends no further than to recognize
that a forced liquidation sale is not always the most satisfactory means of
"winding up" a partnership dissolved by death.
Section 41 of the act is entitled "Liability of Persons Continuing the
Business in Certain Cases."34 It is concerned primarily with the rights of
creditors of a partnership which, though dissolved, has been continued
without liquidation.35 Of specific interest to the proposed interpretation of
section 37 is the use of the term "liquidation" as it appears in paragraphs
(1), (2) and (6) of section 41.86 In these paragraphs of the act it is provided that when a partnership is "liquidated" the proceeds are used to pay
off creditors and then any excess is distributed among the partners so as to
terminate the partnership. But if a partnership is not liquidated on dissolution, and should there be a sale of a partnership interest to remaining
partners, creditors of the first partnership would be fully protected by the
express language of sections 41(1) and (2).37 Thus, in our hypothetical
situation, these same paragraphs would fully protect any creditors of the
D and S partnership should S be permitted under section 37 to obtain a
court-sanctioned purchase of D's interest.
The next part of the act which is relevant to this discussion is section
42,38 which deals both with the rights of a former partner to share in the
34 U.P.A. § 41, which provides: "(l) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership or when any partner retires and assigns (or the representative of the
deceased partner assigns) his rights in partnership property to two or more of the
partners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more third persons, if the
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the first
or dissolved partnership are also creditors of the partnership so continuing in business.
"(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the representative of a deceased
partner assigns) their rights in partnership property to the remaining partner, who
continues the business without liquidation of partnership affairs, either alone or with
others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the business.
"(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved partnership
is continued as set forth in paragraphs (I) and (2) [i.e., without liquidation] of this section, with the consent of the retired partners or the representative of the deceased partner, but without any assignment of his right in partnership property, rights of creditors
of the dissolved partnership and of the creditors of the person or partnership continuing
the business shall be as if such assignment had been made. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
85 See U.P.A. § 41, Commissioners' Note, which states: "This section as a whole deals
primarily with the rights of creditors when a new partner is admitted or a partner
retires, is expelled or dies, and the business is continued without liquidation of the
debts of the partnership dissolved by the change in personnel.'' 7 UNIFORM LAws .ANNOTATED PARTNERSHIP 229 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
80 See note 34 supra.

87
38

Ibid.

U.P.A. § 42, entitled "Rights of Retiring or Estate of Deceased Partner When
the Business Is Continued,'' which provides: "When any partner retires or dies, and
the business is continued under any of the conditions set forth in section 41(1, 2, 3,
5, 6), or section 38(2)(b), without any settlement of accounts as between him or his
estate and the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed,
he or his legal representative as against such persons or partnership may have the
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profits of a continued business and with his relationship to firm creditors.
v\Then the business is continued after dissolution with his consent, a deceased or retired partner is entitled to the value of his interest at the date
of dissolution, plus, at his election, either the profits attributable to the
use of his property or interest on that amount.30 The act does not specifically deal with such partner's rights absent his consent to continuance after
dissolution.40 However, a majority of the courts interpreting this section
have held that consent is not a requisite to an election under section 42. 41
Should the legal representative of a deceased partner seek to receive the
value of the partner's interest at the time of dissolution, certainly a subsequent liquidation sale would be useless in ascertaining the amount of that
interest. Thus, it has been held that a liquidation sale is not required
under section 42 when there is a subsequent election to take the value at
the time of dissolution. Rather, only an accounting is required, and the
manner of payment may be worked out between the parties.42
Only one case has been found in which a surviving partner sought
judicial sanction for the purchase of a deceased partner's interest-Zach
v. Schulman. 43 However, the cause of action asserted in that case was based
value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an
ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu
of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the
dissolved partnership; provided that the creditors of the dissolved partnership as
against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired or deceased partner,
shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as provided by section
41(8) of this act."
39 For cases awarding the value at the time of dissolution (death of one of the partners),
see, e.g., Vanderplow v. Fredricks, 321 Mich. 483, 32 N.W.2d 718 (1948); M. & C. Creditors
Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.) afj'd without opinion, 255 App.
Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1938), afj'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1939);
Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 Atl. 297 (1933); Mattson v. Wagstad, 188 Wis. 566, 206
N.W. 865 (1926). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1084 (1948), on the construction and
application of § 42.
40 Only paragraphs 1, 2, & 3 of § 41, quoted in note 34 supra, deal with retiring
or deceased partners, and under each consent to a continuation is required.
41 See In re Streck's Estate, 35 Ill. App. 2d 473, 183 N.E.2d 26 (1962); M. & C. Creditors
Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 255 App.
Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1938), afj'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1939);
Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 380, 162 N.E. 288, 289 (1928); Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70,
79 A.2d 205 (1951); Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925). Contra, Blut v. Katz,
13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953). The majority interpretation follows the common-law
doctrine -under which a former partner normally received profits or interest at his option
whether the business had been continued with or without consent. E.g., Ruppe v. Utter,
76 Cal. App. 19, 243 Pac. 715 (App. Dist. 1925) (no consent); Drapkin v. Klebanoff, 5 N.J.
Misc. 531, 137 Atl. 432 (Ch. 1927) (no consent). This common-law rule was designed to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the remaining partners. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 709
(1954); 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1271 (1954).
42 In re Shubert's Will, 1 App. Div. 2d 654, 146 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955) (Per curiam),
afj'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 914, 136 N.E.2d 913, 154 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1956) (Per curiam); M. & C.
Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, supra note 41.
43 213 Ark. 122, 210 S.W.2d 124 (1948).
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on section 42. The administrators of the estate of the deceased partner had
agreed with the surviving partner to continue the partnership hotel business. After some operation the surviving partner sued to compel a sale to
him of the deceased partner's interest at a value to be judicially determined.
The administrators cross-claimed for a liquidation of the partnership and
a distribution of the interest in the proceeds to them. Liquidation was
granted and a judicial sale ordered. Evidently the surviving partner had
proceeded on the theory that continuation of the partnership business
conferred upon him the right to elect to purchase the interest of the deceased partner. This contention was rejected by the court, which held that
the language of section 42 related solely to the rights of a deceased partner's
representative and conferred no rights upon the survivor. 44 No fault can
be found with such an interpretation of section 42. However, though the
court did not mention section 37 of the act, 45 it apparently assumed that
the representatives had a right thereunder to demand liquidation. It does
not appear to have been argued-nor did the court consider the matter
-that section 37 conferred any applicable rights upon the surviving
partner. Yet, the consequences of a liquidation in a situation such as that
involved in the Zach case demonstrate the merits of a rule which would
allow the survivor to purchase directly from the legal representative the
interest of the deceased partner. It appears to be a well-settled rule that
though a surviving partner, in his capacity as winding up partner, cannot
sell the partnership assets to himself, he can nevertheless purchase such
assets at a judicial liquidation sale.46 Thus, if either party, survivor or
representative, commences a suit in equity to wind up the partnership,
and a liquidation sale is ordered, there should be nothing to prohibit the
survivor from purchasing at that sale.47 In effect, then, this court refused to
allow the survivor to do directly what he could accomplish indirectly and
possibly at a lower price.
The final section of the act which relates to the problem of this discussion is section 43, entitled "Accrual of Actions."48 Section 43 vests in
any partner, or his legal representative, the right to an account of his interest, which right accrues against the winding-up partners at the date of
dissolution of the partnership.49 Thus, upon the death of a partner the
Zach v. Shulman, 213 Ark. 122, 127-29, 210 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (1948).
Sec text at note 16 supra.
46 See Annot., 1917C Ann. Cas. 948; LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 625.
47 James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13 (1940); Galatis v. Plasman, 80 So. 2d
918 (Fla. 1955); Murphy v. Murphy, 152 Kan. 810, 107 P.2d 700 (1940). See also McGee
v. Russell's Ex'rs, 150 Va. 155, 142 S.E. 524 (1928).
48 U.P.A. § 43, which provides: "The right to an account of his interest shall accrue
to any partner, or his legal representative, as against the winding up partners or the
surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of
dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary."
49 See Trecker v. Trecker, 334 Ill. App. 263, 78 N.E.2d 843 (1948)(mem.). See also
Mattson v. Wagstad, 188 Wis. 566, 206 N.W. 865 (1926). It is not clear whether the duty
to "account,'' as provided for in section 43, requires an actual payment or merely a
44

45
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surviving partner is required to account to the deceased partner's representative for such partner's interest in the partnership business.CiO Yet, this
section does not expressly compel a liquidation of the partnership assets
in order to facilitate the accounting. Nor does it give the representative of
the deceased partner the right to demand a liquidation; rather, the right
given is for an accounting.
In summary, a number of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing
examination of the relevant sections of the Uniform Partnership Act in
their relation to the proposed purchase of a deceased partner's interest by
the surviving partner or partners. First, the problems presented under the
common law as to the protection of creditors of a dissolved partnership
have been dealt with specifically by section 41 and for all practical purposes have been eliminated. Second, section 38(1) of the act gives the right
to require a liquidation of a dissolved partnership only to "each partner"
and not to the legal representative of a deceased partner. Third, "winding
up," as that term is employed by sections 29 and 30, is a term of art, not
necessarily requiring a liquidation sale in every instance. And fourth,
section 37 permits a court to supervise the winding up of a dissolved
partnership upon application showing sufficient "cause." Therefore, since
"any partner" is given the right by section 37 to obtain a court-controlled
"winding up," the only question presented is whether a surviving partner's
desire to purchase the interest of a deceased partner for a fair price is
sufficient "cause" to invoke court supervision within the meaning of the
language of that section. It is submitted that "cause" is a relative concept,
wholly dependent for its meaning upon the circumstances. As used in
section 37, it should not be limited only to those situations demonstrating
bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of one party. "Cause" should encompass all situations in which a question of fairness to all the parties is involved. As so interpreted, a surviving partner's application to a court for
supervision of the "winding up" of a partnership dissolved by death, as
demonstrating a willingness to purchase the deceased partner's interest at
a judicially ascertained fair price, should be legally sufficient "cause" to
invoke the aid of equity.
II.

EQUITABLE PowER ABSENT THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr

The general common-law rule was that when the representative of the
deceased partner and the surviving partners could not agree upon the division of the property in kind or upon the price at which the deceased's interest should be purchased for cash, all the assets of the partnership should
be sold at a liquidation sale and the proceeds divided according to respecstatement of the deceased partner's interest. It is clear, however, that section 43 does not
compel a liquidation.
!iO

Long v. Mertz, 21 N.J. Super. 401, 91 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1952).
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live interests of the partners.51 However, the following statement appears
in Parsons, Partnership:52
"It has sometimes been supposed that the surviving partners have a
right to take all the effects and merchandise (after the debts are paid
or secured) at a valuation. And, undoubtedly, there may be cases in
which this would be a just and beneficial mode of settlement, and the
court could therefore permit or order it. But it must be clear that they
have no such right. Indeed, the right on this point is on the other
side; for it would seem, both from the reason of the case and on the
authorities, that the representatives of the deceased have a right to
require a sale of the effects, as the only certain way of ascertaining
their value and making a fair division. But this again, although a rule,
cannot be deemed a universal rule; for equity may find in particular
circumstances good reasons for not decreeing a sale, although it must
be admitted that it strongly inclines to that mode of settlement, as, on
the whole, the fairest and the safest."63

Of interest for the purposes of this discussion are those cases in which
a court of equity has refused to order a liquidation sale after dissolution
of the partnership even though the parties could not agree on a price for
the former partner's interest. In an English case54 involving the dissolution
of a partnership caused by the death of one of the partners, one of the
partnership's principal assets was an unassignable contract. The court below was directed to value the contract, and to find an account of all the
partnership assets and effects. The survivor was then charged with the
deceased's share so determined. The method of handling dissolution adopted
there was dictated by considerations of expediency; yet, it is clear that the
court could and did protect all parties. An American court was faced with
a similar problem in Colgate's Ex'r v. Colgate. 55 After a partner's death
had dissolved the partnership, the court found that it would be more
advantageous to all the parties to order a direct sale of the decedent's interest to the surviving partners. It was noted that the survivors would be
willing to give full value for the interest in order to avoid liquidation of
the partnership, whereas a purchaser at a judicial sale might offer less due
!il See 40 AM. JuR. Partnership § 306 (1942) where the rule is stated: "The surviving
partners cannot require the personal representatives of the deceased partner to accept
a share in the partnership property at a mere estimated value, but on request must ascertain the value of the firm property by the usual method of selling it." See, e.g., Sigourney
v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11 (1828); Johnson v. Mantz, 69 Iowa 710, 27 N.W. 467 (1886); Bagg
v. Osborn, 169 Minn. 126, 210 N.W. 862 (1926); Gathright v. Fulton, 122 Va. 17, 94 S.E.
191 (1917).
li2 PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP (4th ed. 1893).
li3 Id. § 348, at 441-43 (Emphasis added.) For cases supporting this statement, see
Didlake v. Roden Grocery Co., 160 Ala. 484, 49 So. 384 (1909); Valentine v. Wysor, 123 Ind.
47, 23 N.E. 1076 (1889); Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. Jun. 218, 33 Eng. Rep. 736 (Ch. 1808).
54 Ambler v. Bolton, 14 Eq. 427 (1872).
li5 23 N.J. Eq. 372 (1873).
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to possible defects in title. 56 It should be noted, however, that in neither
of these two cases does the record indicate that the legal representative of
the deceased partner's estate objected to the sale of the interests to the
surviving partners.
Analogous to the above-mentioned situations are cases permitting the
~urviving partner to purchase the partnership assets at a judicial sale.r.7
The concern of the court in James v. Wade 58 is illustrative. After the death
of a partner, the surviving partners filed a bill in equity asking for the
appointment of a receiver to wind up the partnership business. At the
receiver's sale which eventuated, the surviving partners were the purchasers.
The representative of the deceased partner contested the validity of the
sale. In affirming the procedure, the court said:
"We know of no procedure whereby the surviving partners could
have proceeded where all interests would have been protected as well
as in the chancery court....
"This was not a sale by one of the partners, but was a sale by an
officer of the court, and the chancery court seems to have exercised the
utmost caution to protect the interests of all the parties." 159
Thus, once a court is convinced that the rights of the deceased's estate
will be fully protected, the procedure of sale to the survivor would appear
to be satisfactory.Go
In another area of partnership dissolution, that involving retiring
partners or partners wrongfully causing dissolution, some courts have
recognized that there are instances in which a liquidation sale of the
partnership assets is not fair to all the parties concerned. For the purposes
of this discussion, the case of Gelphman v. Gelphman61 is of the most importance. The plaintiff in that case was a partner who had retired because
of illness. After the partnership business had been continued for a time, the
plaintiff sued for an accounting, dissolution of the partnership, and such
other relief as would be proper, but did not specifically request a liquidation and attendant sale. Defendants, the remaining partners, cross-claimed,
asking that plaintiff be required to convey all his interest in the partnership
to them. The reviewing court affirmed an order that the plaintiff execute
and deliver a deed to defendants of his interest in the partnership real
estate. In overruling the plaintiff's contention that a liquidation should
have been ordered, the court said:
Id. at 383.
See cases cited in note 47 supra.
58 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13 (1940).
159 Id. at 792, 141 S.W.2d at 15.
60 See also McGee v. Russell's Ex'rs, 150 Va. 155, 164, 142 S.E. 524, 527 (1928), holding
that a receiver's sale to a surviving partner would not be set aside, as the purchase price
paid by the surviving partner was the best evidence of the value of the partnership assets.
61 142 Kan. 582, 50 P .2d 933 (1935).
56

57

1963]

COMMENTS

119

"Had appellant's present objection been made at the trial, the court
might have ordered the sale of the property, but it was not obliged to
do so. It was competent for the court, sitting as a court of equity, to
adjudge the disposition of the partnership property, to order conveyances of partnership property a'nd to make division of partnership
assets." 62
The court thus appeared to rest its decision on alternative grounds, i.e.,
that plaintiff had not asked for a liquidation sale, and, even if he had, that
a court of equity would not be obliged to order a liquidation sale of
partnership property upon dissolution, but could instead order a conveyance. The case is important for its disclosure of a favorable judicial attitude
toward the inherent power of a court of equity to act in such a manner. 63
However, though equity has at times forced retiring or wrongdoing partners to sell their interests to the remaining partners, no case has been
found in which a court of equity ordered a deceased partner's representative to sell his partnership interest directly to the surviving partners. The
desire to protect the estate of the deceased partner from fraud and overreaching by the surviving partners has apparently been of sufficient magnitude to bar the giving of such relief.

III.

SPECIFIC STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The states of
and Washington65 have enacted specific legislation
enabling a surviving partner or partners of a partnership dissolved by
Ohio64

Id. at 588, 50 P.2d at 936. (Emphasis added.)
See generally Ludlam, Dissolution of Partnerships by Death, 23, Miss. L.J. 117
(1952). Other cases of interest arc Turken v. Olshanski, 237 Mich. 623, 212 N.W. 961
(1927); Dow v. Beals, 149 Misc. 631, 268 N.Y. Supp. 425 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Compare the sale
of a wrongful partner's interest under the U.P.A. § 38(2)(b).
64 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.04 (Page Supp. 1962), which provides: "With the
approval of the probate court by which the executor or administrator for the estate of
a deceased partner was appointed, the surviving partners may take the interest of such
deceased partner in the partnership assets, at the appraised value of such interest after
the debts and liabilities of the partnership are deducted from such partnership assets,
upon giving to the executor or administrator their promissory notes, with good and
approved security, in payment for the interest of the deceased partner in the partnership assets. Such notes shall be payable with interest, in not more than nine months from
the time the surviving partners elect to take such assets. Such election must be made
within thirty days from the date of the approval of the inventory and appraisement by
such court."
65 WASH. REv. CODE§ 11.64.030 (1956), which provides: "The surviving partner or the
surviving partners jointly, shall have the right at any time to petition the court to purchase
the interests of a deceased partner in the partnership. Upon such petition being presented
the court shall, in such manner as it sees fit, learn and by order fix the value of the
interest of the deceased over and above all partnership debts and obligations, and the
terms and conditions upon which the surviving partner or partners may purchase, and
thereafter the surviving partner or partners shall have the preference right for such
length of time as the court may fix, to purchase the interest of the deceased partner at the
price and upon the terms and conditions fixed by the court. If any such surviving partner
be also executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased partner, such fact shall not
affect his right to purchase, or to join with the other surviving partners to purchase such
interest in the manner hereinbefore provided."
62

63
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death to elect to purchase the interests of a deceased partner. No agreement
in the partnership articles is necessary to obtain the benefit of these
statutes. Nor is the consent of the legal representative of the deceased
partner required. 66 In each state the surviving partners need only petition
the appropriate court to inform it of their desire to purchase the deceased's
interest,67 whereupon the appraisement of the deceased partner's interest
is placed in full control of the court. 68 Under both statutory schemes the
surviving partners are required to make full disclosure of partnership inventory, assets and liabilities.69 After notice, and a hearing on the valuation
of the deceased's interest,70 the debts and liabilities of the partnership are
deducted from the value of its appraised assets to determine the proportionate interests of the partners.71 Judicial confirmation of the purchase is
required for the full protection of the deceased partner's estate. As the
Washington court has said, the statutory procedure has two primary purposes. First, it grants a preference right to the surviving partner to purchase
the deceased partner's interest; and second, it places a duty upon the court
to ascertain the value of the deceased partner's interest and establish the
terms of the sale.72
The Ohio legislation allows the surviving partners to give their secured
notes for the purchase price, payable not more than nine months from the
date the surviving partners elect to purchase.73 The Washington statute
permits the court to fix the terms, conditions and time of the purchase.74
Both statutory enactments also require that a bond (Ohio; 75 Washington,
"may be" required if it appears necessary to the court76) be given by the
surviving partners to the legal representative of the deceased partner to in66 The Ohio legislature in 1957 amended its original statute, which had required the
consent of the deceased's executor or administrator to such purchase. The requirement of
consent by the executor was thought not to be consistent with the substantive rights of
the surviving partner to purchase at the appraised value. The language requiring such
consent was thus deleted from the statutory provisions. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.04
(Page Supp. 1962); Sater, Recent Amendments Affecting Probate Practice, 18 Omo
ST. L.J. 464, 468 (1957).
67 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE § ll.64.030
(1956). Moreover, even where the surviving partner is also the executor or administrator of
the deceased partner, his right under these statutes is not affected thereby. This jg true
in Washington by virtue of specific statutory language. WASH. REv. CODE§ 11.64.030 (1956).
By decision the Ohio statute has been interpreted to reach the same result. See Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875).
68 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE §§ ll.64.002,
.030 (1956).
69 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE §§ ll.64.002,
.022 (1956).
70 OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 1779.01 (Page Supp. 1962); WASH. REv. CODE § ll.64.030
(1956).
11 Ibid.
72 In re Giant's Estate, 57 Wash. 2d 309, 356 P.2d 707 (1960).
73 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1778.04 (Page Supp. 1962).
74 WASH. REV. CODE§ ll.64.030 (1956).
75 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.05 (Page Supp. 1962).
10 WASH. REv. CoDE § 11.64.016 (1956).
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sure the payment of all partnership debts and the performance of all partnership contracts.77 Finally, it is specifically provided in the Ohio statute,78 and
necessarily implied thoughout the Washington legislation, that the legal
representative must deliver to the surviving partners an assignment of the
interest of the deceased partner in the partnership assets and cause a certificate of transfer of title to issue as to partnership real estate. Since the
statutory provisions discussed above are quite explicit in outlining the procedure to be followed, relatively little litigation has arisen concerning their
use. It is clear, however, that the statutory procedure must be explicitly
complied with if the option to purchase is intended to be exercised.79
Of comparative interest to this discussion is a North Carolina statuteso
which embodies essentially the same basic procedures as do the Ohio and
'Washington provisions. However, the North Carolina statute requires not
only the approval of the court, but also the "consent of the executor or
administrator" of the deceased partner before a surviving partner may
purchase his interest. (Emphasis added.) In effect, this statutory provision
recognizes the considerations of policy motivating the Ohio and Washington
legislation; yet, it places a potentially insurmountable obstacle in the
path of the privilege otherwise granted. It might well be argued that the
requirement of the executor's consent is inconsistent with the survivor's
supposed statutory right to purchase. Moreover, rather than curtailing the
strict common-law rule as to sales between surviving partners and representatives of deceased partners, this legislation introduces the additional requirement of judicial confirmation before such a sale can be consummated.

IV.

CONCLUSION

When a partnership is dissolved by the death of one of the partners,
three interests arise which the law should endeavor to protect. The first is
the interest of the creditors of the dissolved partnership. In states which
have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, such interests are fully protected
by its section 41. The two remaining interests are those of the surviving
partners and those of the estate of the deceased partner. As between these
two interests, the common law developed doctrines designed primarily to
Ibid.; Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.05 (Page Supp. 1962).
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1779.05 (Page Supp. 1962).
70 Weitz v. Weitz, 15 Ohio App. 134 (1921).
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-81 (1960), which, in part, provides: " ... (b) Surviving Partner
May Purchase.-The surviving partner may, with the consent of the executor or administrator of the deceased partner and the approval of the clerk of the superior court
by whom such executor or administrator was appointed, purchase the interest of such
deceased partner in the partnership assets at the appraised value thereof, including the
good will of the business, first deducting therefrom the debts and liabilities of the partnership, for cash or upon giving to the executor or administrator his promissory note or notes,
with good approved security, and satisfactory to the executor or administrator, for the
payment of the interest of such deceased partner in the partnership assets.'' (Emphasis
added.)
77

78
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safeguard the latter. Absent an express agreement between the partners,
very little consideration was given to the protection of the survivor's continuing interest. This discussion has attempted to demonstrate that the
possibility of fraud being worked upon the estate of a deceased partner
should no longer be controlling when a court has within its supervisory
powers the ability to fully protect all the interests arising from a partnership dissolution caused by death. The specific statutory provisions of Ohio
and Washington indicate that at least several legislatures have acknowledged this fact. Yet, a result similar to that provided for in those statutes
appears to be readily available under section 37 of the Uniform Partnership Act itself. To read "winding up" as invariably necessitating a liquidation upon a dissolution caused by death of a partner is to misconstrue the
language of section 37. "Winding up" is a term of art; it was conceived as
such and should be so interpreted. Thus, a court should be able to proceed
under section 37 with that form of "winding up" which most adequately
protects the interests of all the parties in the particular situation before it.
In many instances, then, a judicially supervised sale of a deceased partner's
interest to the surviving partners would conceivably constitute that form
of "winding up." By reading into section 37 the common-law power of the
representative of a deceased partner to compel liquidation, the representative is in effect given an uncontrolled option either to proceed under
section 42 (to recover the value of the deceased partner's interest at the
time of dissolution plus either interest or profits) or to force a liquidation.
This latter alternative has awesome potential as a bargaining weapon in
any negotiations between the representative and the surviving partners relating to the continuation of the business. It is indeed questionable
whether the fortuitous occurrence of death should occasion such a result.
Rather, section 42 alone seems to protect fully all legitimate interests of a
deceased partner's estate, and the common-law power to force a liquidation
of the partnership assets is no longer necessary to insure a fair valuation
of the deceased partner's share. It is widely recognized that any wellconsidered partnership agreement takes into account the effect of the
death of any of the partners. The vast majority of such agreements therefore include some provision negating the supposed necessity, at common
law, of liquidation upon dissolution of the partnership. It seems inherently
reasonable that the uniform law of partnership, applicable in the absence
of a specific agreement, should be interpreted to conform with what most
partners would desire had they considered the problem. By interpreting
section 37 to allow a surviving partner, on application to a competent
court, to purchase a deceased partner's interest at fair value and after a
fair appraisal, this result could best be effectuated.

Charles R. Frederickson

